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AbstractThis thesis investigates the relationship between how much economic influencea country has and how much risk the market assesses associates with thatcountry. This is done by regressing macroeconomic variables with theoreticaleffect on the repayment ability of a sovereign state, upon 10-year governmentbond yields. We examine a panel data model consisting of OECD countriesbetween 1980 and 2013. We divide the countries into two groups: the G7 groupand small countries. We find that there are distinguishable differences betweenlarger and smaller countries and that there is evidence for the US having aspecial position in the world economy. The results are however somewhatdistorted by the latest financial crisis. Smaller countries are harsher judged ontheir unemployment rate and budget balance whereas larger countries are morelikely to experience a decrease in bond yields as their net lending increases. TheUS has a higher correlation between its GDP growth and bond yield and hasapart from the other large countries also a positive effect of running a deficit inthe current account, positive effect meaning a negative relation between the twoas a lower bond yield is generally desirable. The effect from government debtdoes not seem to be much difference between the groups but is slightly strongeramong larger countries.
Key Words: Government bond, sovereign bond, 10-year bond, long term bond,yield, macroeconomic variables, G7, OECD, USA.
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1. IntroductionGovernment bonds are used to fund a government’s expenses including repayingold bonds becoming due. A government typically issues bonds for a fixed amountthrough an appropriate authority, in the US case the U.S. Treasury, at abeforehand decided interest rate. The market then decides whether the bondsare a good investment given a list of factors, not the least the credit rating of theissuing country. That aside, bond yields are mainly determined by the issuer’sperceived creditworthiness, its general risk and in some cases an exchange raterisk. The risk that a nation will default is generally regarded to be low (eventhough there have been cases of default in the past) and sovereign bonds aregenerally issued at low yields. Even though it is rare that sovereign bond is notfully subscribed, it occurs every now and then, indicating that the marketperceives the yield to low given the risk involved and in relation to otherinvestment alternatives.
This article looks at two sets of countries: the G7 and a set of eight other OECDcountries. We use this division as we want to elucidate how a country’s influenceon the world economy affects its bond yield. To do this we look at howmacroeconomic variables affect the bond yields in the two groups; therebycapturing how much risk the market perceives is connected to the differentexplanatory variables and the economic influence of a country (here we assumethat the countries within the groups are more or less homogenous). Weinvestigate data from 1980-2013 and use 10-year government bonds issued inUSD, thereby making the exchange rate risk less palpable as the USD is thebenchmark currency of the world. Furthermore, given that the US has a specialposition as the world’s leading economy, meaning it has the most power to affectthe world market, we will investigate if this notion makes investors judge the USvariables differently from all other countries in the sample.
To untangle these possible advantages (the hypothesis is that any differencesmost likely will be advantages, an assumption widely supported in internationaleconomics), we will compare the G7 countries to a group of ad hoc selectedOECD countries which were chosen based on past financial stability for reliabledata and availability of data.
4Apart from the 10-year bond yields, we have data on a set of macroeconomicvariables between the years 1980 and 2013. Based on previous studies thevariables have been divided into basic and additional data; basic variables will beused in almost all regressions whereas additional variables only will be added toa regression of basic variables.
Our results suggest that both the G7 and especially the USA has a favoredposition in the bond market, compared to the other, smaller, OECD countries wehave included in our data set. The G7 countries show much less sensitivity tofiscal deficits as well as to unemployment rate. The US, apart from being a G7country, has an advantage in the fact that both current account and net lendingseems to have a significant negative effect on their long term bond yields.
This thesis will start by introducing the economic theoretical frameworkconcerning how macroeconomic factors can affect an economy (and in extensionits ability to repay loans) and a summarization of previous studies in the field.Following that, we present the data set and explain the method used to deriveour results. The largest part of the thesis is however the results and analysissection, where all the findings will be thoroughly presented, followed by a shortsegment with robustness checks. Lastly we summarize the main takeaways inthe conclusion ending with suggestions for future research.
2. Theory
The purpose of this section is to provide a short theoretical motivation of the
selected variables as well as providing the reader with additional understanding
for the mechanism of estimating the risk attached to a sovereign bond.
Macroeconomic theory tells us that running large budget deficits andconsequently increasing ones sovereign debt encourages the interest rate toincrease. It leads to hindered economic growth via for instance a decreasedinvestment rate in the long run. The dampening investment effect and thedeclining GDP growth rate is reflected by the rise in the long-term governmentbond yields.
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Let us now attach the above statement with a more in-depth theoretical analysisof the interaction between the various economic factors and their effects on thelong-term bond yields. To unravel the different relations we will begin with theIS-LM model, which is a natural starting points in the search of suitableexplanatory variables. Through the perspective of a large economy an increase innet exports or in government expenditure, via for instance larger fiscal deficitcaused by a rise in the debt level, will push the equilibrium to shift and results ina higher interest rate level. However, a reverse effect on the interest rate occurswhen the domestic money supply expands, which is clear by looking at the LM-curve (Pilbeam, K., 2013).
It is obvious by consulting the Mundell-Flemming model that there is a positiverelationship between deficit and interest rate i.e. debt financing rises the interestrate and it might possibly contribute to a crowding out effect or, additionally, itexpands output via a stimulation of aggregated demand. The long run is,however, quite different and according to Bernheim (1987) it is a rather difficultassignment to describe it. Since the Keynesian IS-LM model requires numerousassumptions, Bernheim summarises the long run effects to be a fairly complexissue, as various effects cannot be excluded from the analysis. Thus, theoreticallyit is a rather difficult task to properly depict as it can easily be entangled throughperspectives covering short and long run effects.
Bearing the complex nature in mind let us make an attempt to picture the wholetheoretical image. Through the eyes of the monetary policy we can investigatethe short and long run interest rate by introducing the expectations hypothesis.In short, the long-term interest rate depends on the average of today’s and theforecasted short-term interest rate levels:
≈ ( + + + +⋯+ ) (1)
The equation is expressed in logs on both sides. A crucial assumption that isembedded in the formula is the risk neutrality; otherwise if investors arebelieved to be risk aversive one has to include a corresponding risk premium
6because it works as a compensation factor for the investors to bear theunderlying asset (Sørensen & Witter-Jacobsen, 2010). A similar relation isexpected when referring to inflation and its effect on the government bond yield.Ceteris paribus, an increase in inflation leads to, potentially, a climb on the long-run Phillips curve (Sørensen & Witter-Jacobsen, 2010). In other words, theinflation variable is believed to have a positive effect on the long-term yield. Thecurrent account and its shifting factors vary negatively with the yield curve as ahigher net export lowers the spreads via a stronger position in the balance ofpayments hence providing a growth in GDP (Pilbeam, 2013).
Combining the descriptions of the small selection of some of the explanatoryvariables and their contributions to the riskiness of default, expressed throughthe changes of the yield rates, it becomes obvious that factors related to riskyaspects lower the distance to default. Since for example reckless governmentborrowing decreases the distance, it means that in order to attract investors thecompensation has to be increased because of the additional risk level rise of thegovernment bond. Turning our attention to the other side, we have aspects thataffect the economy positively, i.e. increases the distance to default, resulting in ayield decline via for instance a higher GDP growth, lower unemployment rate or,as mentioned previously, stronger current account figures.
3. Empirical Studies
This section covers previous studies in the field, which naturally is our starting point.
In brief, the related studies point toward complex relationships depending on the
various statistical approaches and the variables’ characteristics. At the end of the
section there is a short summary highlighting the key information.
In theory, higher government bond yields are connected with for instanceunstable fiscal positions such as a large fiscal deficit. The vulnerable situationcorresponds to an equilibrium rise in the interest rate, which in turn is a result ofa new allocation of resources leading to a crowding out effect. Additionally, anunhealthy fiscal position encourages a heavier inflationary pressure because of amore aggressive monetary policy. Moreover, a further rise in fiscal deficitcontributes to an increase in the interest rate and thus increases the bond yield.
7Such scenario is regarded as a compensation of the riskiness of the underlyingasset, which potential investors have to bear. In other words, the associated risklevel emphasises that the probability of default should change to thecorresponding level (Gruber W & Kamin B, 2010).
In order to understand the complexity of fiscal variables have on the yieldspreads, Alper & Forni (2011), Baldacci & Kumar (2010) and Ardagna et al.(2004) address the presence of possible nonlinearity dilemma. Such scenariowould lead to, at a certain debt level, an acceleration effect. In fact, Baldacci &Kumar (2010) point, in their conclusion, that one of their main discoveries is thepresence of such acceleration effect on long-term interest rate contributed byfiscal deterioration whereas Alper & Forni (2011) suggest that by excluding acontrol vector that grasps inter alia the current account balance to GDP only thena U-shape curve occurs. Returning to Ardagna et al. (2004) who use a panel datafor 16 OECD countries show of a time span of 1960-2002 discover strongevidence of non-linearity in the public debt that is: the long-term interest rateresponses negatively to an increase in the public debt to GDP ratio if for instancethe ratio is below 62.5 per cent. Moreover, a 10-basis-point rise in the nominalinterest rate on the ten-year government bonds is caused if, ceteris paribus, theprimary deficit-to-GDP rises. In other words, an unhealthy fiscal deficit and agrowing public debt are both accelerating faster in relation to the correspondingamounts. However, going back to Gruber W & Kamin B (2010), who found thatsuch acceleration effect should be more present during turbulent times, is overallstatistically insignificant1. Hence, the contradiction that appears is anotherindication of its complexity.
Furthermore, Engen & Hubbard (2004) focuses, inter alia, on the long-term USAgovernment bond yield and the results do somewhat intertwine with thecomplexness findings of the acceleration effect. In their results, that covers mid70’s and ends in early 00’s, they show that potentially better estimates would be
1 In brief, Gruber & Kumar use panel data samples consisting of OECD countriesand a G-7 sample stretching from 1988 up to 2007. Baldacci & Kumar use thesame method for a panel during 1980-2008 of 31 advanced and emergingeconomies where the advanced are for example: Australia, Denmark, Germany,Japan, USA and so forth.
8to include five years forecasts of debt to GDP instead of the current debt to GDPvariable since the forecasted variable is significant at a percentage level of 10. Inshort, Gruber & Kamins’ (2010) main results display a relationship where onepercentage increase in structural deficit or net debt ratio to GDP contribute to a15 and 2-percentage boost in the yield curve respectively, for G-7 countries. Asthe results are roughly half the size when looking at the OECD countries sample,the G7 estimations’ size corresponds to the idea that their bond yields have ahigher degree of market driven factors as determinants .
Baldacci & Kumar (2010) use a slightly different approach that involves theutilisation of an interactive dummy variable that aims to capture the accelerationeffect of the corresponding fiscal deficit and a country’s characteristics. Theinclusion of interactive term augments the model, which sheds further lights onthe role fiscal variables have on the yield structure. In general, a higher deficitcreates a tougher path toward recovery. Secondly, during turbulent periodsnegative shocks produce higher volatility debt dispersions for countries withhigh fiscal deterioration. Thirdly, higher debt levels rises the interest ratebecause it responses to the changes in the fiscal deterioration (Baldacci & Kumar,2010).
The recent crises challenge the economic markets’ conditions. In the midst of thefinancial crisis Aßmann and Hogrefe (2009) provide an insight of the pre-andpost crisis’s impact on the long-term Euro government bonds. By adopting atrader’s point of view of default risk2 they were able to show that during a fewweeks in 2003 there was a shift in the yields’ structure. The period of pre-2003all the four ratio-variables are significant whereas post-2003 only debt to GDPratio is significant followed by, again, the four variables become significant at thebrink of the financial crisis. In summary, because of the single currency the yieldspreads work as a mirror image of the Euro-area’s liquidity and credit risk.
2 A trader’s main risk indicators are believed to be forecasts of: debt ratio, budgetbalance ratio and current account ratio where all are relative to their specificcountries’ GDP. Also, they use the outstanding amount of domestic debtsecurities of the public sector in order to proxy the market capitalisation i.e.liquidity risk. Lastly, since the sample space covers early years of 21th centuryup to March 2009, weekly data adjusted to German bond spreads of the tenoldest EU-members have been used.
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Although Aßmann and Hogrefe (2009) statistically found a relationship betweenmacro variables and the yield curve, Barrios et al. (2009) argue in order toreceive a deeper, and perhaps a clearer, picture of the interaction of thesevariables it preferably is an advantage to use quarterly data rather than weeklydata. More specifically on average, a one-percentage increase in a Euro-country’sfiscal deterioration boosts the yield with 2,4 basis point relative to the Germanyields spreads.
Combining Barrios et al. (2009) results with studies such as Baldacci & Kumar(2010), a heavier emphasis of acceleration scenarios appear to exist for at leastEuro-countries during the early 21th century years. In order to avoid collinearityBarrios et al. omits the fiscal balance when focusing on the impact of the debtvariable and its squared term, both lagged by one quarter. The facts that bothvariables are statistically significant indicate of non-linearity nature. In additionsince the value of the squared term is higher than debt itself point toward afaster acceleration effect of the yield curve (2009).
A common feature of Barrios et al and Aßmann & Hogrefe (2009) is the findingthat the debt level in the Euro-area helps to, rather successfully, explain one ofthe underlying forces driving the long-term government bond yields. Moreover,Barrios et al. (2009) state that generally because of the unstable public financeschannelled through high current account deficits and debt levels put furtherfinancial constraints thus decreases the distance to default for a Euro member.
Continuing on the focus of the EMU government bond spreads another economicand statistical approach is to substitute the fiscal variables with rating dataprovided by rating agencies. In fact, Manganelli & Wolswijk (2009) argue that bydoing such replacement it will benefit the estimates because rating data do notonly include current fiscal positions but also future, i.e. forecasts, of the variables.In brief, the methodical approach to capture the different yield levels a logicalway is to use the German long-term government bonds as a benchmark since it israted: AAA. Next step is to calculate the difference between triple bond and AA+and continue in the same manner for the gap between AA+ and non-AA+ bonds.
10This procedure gives the associated risk premiums corresponding to the variousdistances to default intervals.As previously mentioned3, the role of the interest rate is found to be one of theunderlying macroeconomic factors supported by statistically significance. Inother words, a high rate level pushes the yield curve upwards. Moreover, in anoccurrence of a downgrade event it leads to austerity fiscal measures thatautomatically push up the interest rate. Obviously, the opposite scenariohappens in a time characterised with loose monetary policies linked with lowinterest rates that contribute to an overall yield spread reduction (Manganelli &Wolswijk, 2009).
Although Ludvigson & Ng (2009) mainly focus on the macro factors interactionin the US bond risk premium there is, however, a correlation when combiningtheir findings with spread fluctuations in the Euro-market when taking intoaccount international factors done by Manganelli & Wolswijk (2009). In shortLudvigson & Ng (2009) are able to show that US risk premiums and excess bondreturns are determined by various macro factors, such as inflation. Furthermore,it is necessary to mentioned that in spite of a large monthly data, which begins inJanuary 1964 and ends in December 2003, it consists of one and up to five yearcoupon US government bond prices4. The authors are able to establishpredicative estimation powers that unfortunately decline the longer theforecasted periods are. Nonetheless, it is clear that such factors play importantrole of explaining the US government bond yields (Ludvigson & Ng, 2009).
Combining the previously stated empirical facts, Manganelli & Wolswijk (2009)use the ten-year US government bond as a benchmark leading to discoveries, forexample interest rate variable continues to be significant and positive, thatsupport the influential aspect of international factors at the Euro governmentbond market. Needless to say, the US economy seems to play an important globalfactor, which spills over into the EMU government bond markets.  Alper & Forni
3 Please see for instance: Baldacci & Kumar (2010)4 For interested readers please view page: 5036 for more detail description ofthe data.
11(2011)5 point to a similar tendency as they conclude that the interest rate and itschannel is a successful factor when addressing the various spillover effectscaused by advanced economies where especially USA’s long-term interest rateshave externalities characteristics on other OECD yields.
In a time span that covers almost the entire decade of the nineties, Claessens et al(2007) present support that combine lower inflation rates relate to larger localgovernment bond markets. The reason is because a low rate also has lowinflation volatility leading to a non-inflate debt situation, which in turn makes thedebt level less risky.
Interestingly, Alper & Forni (2011) point toward a negative relationship betweenyields and expected inflation, meaning that it decreases the yields in theadvanced economies (2011). Comparing their results with Arslanalp &Poghosyan (2014), who investigate several advanced economies in quarterlypanel data over 2004-2012, it becomes clear that the influential aspect ofinflation as a yield determinant is rather ambiguous. Theoretically higherexpected inflation results in a higher yield level, which is proposed by Arslanalp& Poghosyan. Regardless (2014) of having a small impact, nonetheless it helps toexplain the variation of the dependent variable. Al other variables constant, a 1-percentage change fluctuates the bond yield by 18-23-percentage movement.The minor change mirrors the statement that in advanced economies inflationexpectations are kept at low levels thus long-term investor regard theimportance as a diminishing factor.
In contrast to Baldacci & Kumar (2010) who, in overall, point toward aninsignificant negative GDP growth effect on the bond spreads whereas Arslanalp& Poghosyan (2014) manage to statistically present a negative relationshipbetween yield and growth levels explained by the possibility that quarterly datagrasp the fluctuations better than annual data. The insignificant argument of GDPgrowth is further supported by Alper & Forni (2011) since their results show a
5 The sample space covers panel data of the years 2002-2010 for both advancedand emerging economies.
12non-significant connection on expected one-year real GDP growth has onadvanced economies long-term government bonds.
Obviously, the mixed findings provide different insights of the OECD economies’yield levels. The different results depend, among other things, on theeconometric methods and the data’s characteristics.Another interesting aspect that should be highlighted is the interplay betweencurrent account and the magnitude of the debt level. Nickel & Vansteenkiste(2008) point toward in their panel data analysis of 22 industrial economiesstretching between 1981 up to 2005 found that in their reduced country sampleconsisting of the eleven largest euro area countries show that the interactionbecomes insignificant when the GDP debt level ratio exceeds 80 %.
To summarise the key aspects there are diffuse findings concerning thecontribution of debt to GDP of the yield curve. In addition, the equivocalityinvolve an absent or an occurrence of potential debt acceleration effectscaptured by the variable: . Short-run interest rate with its statisticalsignificance appears to affect to government bonds positively whereas expectedinflation does not share the equivalent clear interpretation. In other words theunclear reflection is stressed by for instance results presented by Alper & Forni(2011) who found a negative relationship upon the yield structure. Finally, GDPgrowth ratio does not generally help to reveal the complicated long-rungovernment bond subject.
4. Data
The data section will briefly introduce the reader to the data we have collected.
We will use a panel data model to study the difference between the two groups.The G7 group consists of USA, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy andCanada with an average GDP of 3.727.126.392 USD in 2012 years nominal values.The small countries group consist of Spain, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium,Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Finland with an average GDP of 458.315.354,
13again with 2012 years nominal values6. The intuition behind this division is toinvestigate if economies that arguably can affect the world economy more (G7countries) can be significantly distinguished from smaller western countries. Thedata start in 1980 and ends in 2013 and are on an annual basis.
The selection of what variables to include was done by testing after havinggathered possible affecting variables from the IS/LM model. The variablesincluded in our regressions are; the dependent variable: 10-year bond yields,basic variables: short-term interest rate, inflation, GDP growth, government debtas percentage of GDP and Budget balance as percentage of GDP, and theadditional variables: unemployment rate, current account balance as percentageof GDP and net lending/borrowing as percentage of GDP. All data have beencollected from the databases “OECD Economic outlook” and “Datastream” andhave been estimated via Eviews. However, the panel data are not entirelycompleted since there are missing values in the beginning and at the end of thesample space i.e. early years of 1980’s and for some variables during 2013. Adetailed description of the data is available in Appendix. The appendix alsocontains descriptive statistics and figures of the data.
5. Model and Method
This part will clarify how we have constructed our model and what specifications
we have used for our regressions. We will also explain why we do so and justify our
choice of method.
The econometric estimation are done by constructions of fixed effects panel leastsquares (for a detailed description of fixed effects please see: Kennedy 2008)through general to specific approach and Generalized Method of Moments(GMM). With White’s period robust standard errors the PLS regression7 is:
= + + + + + + + + (2)
6 See appendix for the list of selected countries with GDP.7 In matrix notation we have: = + expressed in panel data form under theassumption of no heteroscedasticity and stationary properties (Wackerly et al.2008)
14where is the short-term interest rate, is the inflation rate and is theprevious year’s debt to GDP ratio, capture debt’s acceleration effect,represents the previous year’s fiscal balance to GDP ratio in per cent,represents different included variables such as unemployment rate, currentaccount and net lending. Finally, all explanatory variables are expressed inpercentage form.
All variables have been tested for stationarity using an Augmented Dickey Fuller(ADF) test8. All variables except the current account are stationary. However, it isassumed to be stationary in the long run and therefore the decision was madenot to investigate stationary characteristics further in order not to loosepotential important information, which can of course penalise our estimationsand analyses. In brief, there is a trade off between correct economicallyinterpretations and achieving good statistical properties. Moreover, such tradeoff creates other problematic issues for instance the credibility ofmisspecification test for example structural break test. Potential non-linearity ornon-stationary problems make Ramsey RESET tests unreliable (Banerjee et al.2010) and henceforth we ask the reader to bear the trade off issue in mind.
Because of the dilemma the GMM approach works as a back up approachbecause it relaxes some of the OLS assumptions and instead uses an instrumentalvariable, we use lagged dependent variable that grasps different method ofmoment problems (Verbeek, 2012). Lastly, correlation matrices for the differentvariables and descriptive statistics are presented in the appendix. The OLS-method regressions have been estimated with fixed cross-section and periodeffects and white period robust standard errors. In the case of using GMM, theregressions have been estimated using fixed period effects but with a differencecross-section effect using AB 1-step GMM weights and white period standarderrors. In the tables below, * marks significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% leveland *** at a 1% level, standard errors are given in parenthesis below all thecoefficients.
8 For more detail description please consult Enders (2010) and for the usage ofrobust standard errors see Verbeek, (2012)
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6. Results and Analysis
In this section we will go through all our results in detail. Although we present all
regressions for continuity and transparency, comments will only be made on
coefficients which are interesting from an economic inference perspective. Values
which are worth examining closer are highlighted with bold print. The reader can
easily find how the regressions are constructed by observing what variables are
included in the tables. A summarization of the key results can be found in the last
paragraph of the chapter.
Taking our starting point in previous studies, this study will begin with the basicvariables presented above. Initial general-to-specific approach are in line withearlier findings and support the chosen starting point. Initially we willinvestigate the two samples individually and then join the samples together anduse dummies to distinguish between the two groups. Lastly a dummy for the USwill be added in the same manner as for the G7 group. We are looking forsignificant differences between the two sub samples, mainly with focus on theGMM regressions even though the standard errors of the OLS.
Let us begin with the base regressions for the G7 countries sample seen in Table1. The first regression excludes the fiscal balance variable and instead uses thelagged debt variable. According to the table, the variable GDP growth is the onlyvariable that is insignificant, suggesting that it does not contribute to a variationof the dependent variable. Interestingly, when replacing lagged debt variablewith lagged fiscal balance growth becomes significant; hence there is apossibility that previously year’s debt to GDP is heavily correlated with GDPgrowth. The economic interpretation takes the form of a clash between the twovariables i.e. a crowding out effect where if the debt level in the previous yearhas increased with an additional unit percentage it crowds out the current GDPgrowth by a certain percentage amount because of the strangle effect it has oninvestment opportunities. Moving on to regression 3, the inclusion of thesquared variable of previous annually debt level we can conclude that the theoryof an acceleration effect cannot be supported, thus leading to the conclusion thatnon-linearity phenomenon is not a problem. Including fiscal balance makes thedebt level insignificant and
16
Table 1
OLS Basic Variables for G7 Countries
Variables Reg. 1 Reg . 2 Reg . 3 Reg . 4 Reg . 5
C 3.190069*** 3.302938*** 3.190163*** 3.294824*** 3.291584***
(0.094135) (0.184237) (0.091339) (0.200288) (0.193686)
SIR 0.385950*** 0.277492*** 0.386943*** 0.310756*** 0.312966***
(0.048209) (0.048518) (0.048414) (0.041848) (0.044055)
I 0.299091*** 0.320563*** 0.299325*** 0.245703*** 0.247696***
(0.077817) (0.070601) (0.078434) (0.064178) (0.064078)
G 0.057526 0.132522*** 0.057026 0.120218*** 0.119558***
(0.048487) (0.040040) (0.048863) (0.038082) (0.035508)
DEBT(-1) 0.031054*** 0.032287*** -0.003467 -0.000280
(0.009329) (0.009645) (0.013379) (0.011782)
DEBT(-1)^2 -0.000289 -0.001238
(0.001028) (0.001225)
BB(-1) -0.064858** -0.065948** -0.069878**
(0.031839) (0.028835) (0.031227)
Adj. r^2 0.967606 0.972784 0.967426 0.972844 0.972789
AIC 2.089412 2.136560 2.098387 2.003038 2.008724
BIC 2.774736 2.911240 2.799287 2.786368 2.809461
DW 0.961306 0.986810 0.958404 1.020220 1.003503
OLS Additional Variables for G7 Countries
Variables Reg . 6 Reg . 7 Reg . 8 Reg . 9 Reg . 10 Reg . 11
C 2.517437*** 2.502002*** 3.086721*** 3.079078*** 3.182419*** 3.180600***
(0.376421) (0.368059) (0.182063) (0.205912) (0.100902) (0.104843)
SIR 0.381012*** 0.383279*** 0.402650*** 0.396876*** 0.386942*** 0.388256***
(0.043296) (0.043810) (0.039953) (0.043348) (0.050384) (0.051079)
I 0.319334*** 0.320366*** 0.286906*** 0.287692*** 0.299262*** 0.299556***
(0.076155) (0.076727) (0.102773) (0.101795) (0.077630) (0.078233)
G 0.079172* 0.078474* 0.056059 0.058972 0.057758 0.057278
(0.043321) (0.043451) (0.052274) (0.056217) (0.047682) (0.048040)
DEBT(-1) 0.020028* 0.022730* 0.024958*** 0.010599 0.031003*** 0.032314***
(0.012099) (0.011563) (0.005993) (0.020721) (0.009396) (0.009713)
DEBT(-1)^2 -0.000693 0.002135 -0.000310
(0.000966) (0.002781) (0.001075)
U 0.082653* 0.084577*
(0.046988) (0.046360)
CA -0.010692 -0.015131
(0.043916) (0.048345)
LEND -0.001069 -0.001337
(0.004598) (0.005093)
Adj. r^2 0.968525 0.968386 0.962992 0.963075 0.967420 0.967238
AIC 2.064048 2.071846 2.065050 2.066265 2.098568 2.107510
BIC 2.764949 2.788321 2.779901 2.797002 2.799468 2.823986
DW 0.976445 0.969435 0.901388 0.906928 0.961886 0.958962
17it suggests a potential collinearity situation (see for instance: Salvador et al.2009) as by running the regressions that only include one of these variablespoint toward a significant effect on the long-run government bond yield.
Not surprisingly when running the two explanatory variables simultaneously asin regression five, it is only the lagged fiscal balance that is significant whichagain emphasises the presence of collinearity. By having this in mind, we excludethe fiscal balance variable in favour of the debt variable when testing foradditional variables. The modified models reveal a statistically significance,which the unemployment ratio has upon the dependent variable whereas thecurrent account and private lending do not share a corresponding statisticalimpact. The significant variables share a positive relation with the dependentvariable. and debt has increased with one percentage unit it contributes to anapproximately 0,02 percentage additional increase in the long-term yield curve.Combining the findings with previous studies such as Baldacci & Kumar (2010)and Alper & Forni (2011) our estimations seem to disagree with Baldacci &Kumar when looking at the acceleration effect while partially agree with Alper &Forni. Nonetheless together with what Baldacci & Kumar conclude, our resultspoint toward an overall fiscal deterioration effect among the G7 economies.
Let us turn our attention to the small countries’ sample in table 2. The sameprocedure was used and according to the results when including the differentoptional variables inflation is, in overall, significant except for running theregression that has private lending (see regression 11). Combining the findingswith the fact that an increase of the short term interest rate is a response to thesudden rise in inflation it makes sense that such estimation results is likely,accordingly it should be highlighted and noted.
In general, the findings do, somewhat, support the idea presented by Gruber &Kamin (2010) that since the fiscal variables such as debt have higher valuespoint toward that the G7 sample has a heavier emphasise of market drivenfactors as their underlying determinants.  In a more in-depth analysis we cannote that the majority of the findings do not support the idea of a debtacceleration effect.
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Table 2
OLS Basic Variables for Small Countries
Variables Reg . 1 Reg . 2 Reg . 3 Reg . 4 Reg . 5
C 3.137415*** 3.625639*** 3.076668*** 3.605228*** 3.535828***
(0.469167) (0.249439) (0.455833) (0.245278) (0.231204)
SIR 0.534826*** 0.401979*** 0.539282*** 0.395031*** 0.397232***
(0.099791) (0.044695) (0.100923) (0.050598) (0.050457)
I 0.126671 0.117843 0.122386 0.125392 0.119220
(0.078355) (0.086362) (0.077538) (0.093130) (0.093723)
G -0.009409 -0.087608 -0.007952 -0.090773 -0.085935
(0.049156) (0.065767) (0.045083) (0.059722) (0.054830)
DEBT(-1) 0.069590*** 0.057203** -0.007420 -0.023851
(0.022369) (0.023987) (0.021023) (0.021050)
DEBT(-1)^2 0.002403 0.003948***
(0.001916) (0.001022)
BB(-1) -12.43722*** -12.79047*** -12.52650***
(2.265532) (2.970628) (2.859628)
Adj. r^2 0.955974 0.969252 0.956223 0.967093 0.968804
AIC 2.376942 1.680051 2.374407 1.691612 1.641593
BIC 3.014459 2.398860 3.026091 2.419928 2.385742
DW 0.799258 0.930726 0.811002 0.928937 1.034547
OLS Additional Variables for Small Countries
Variables Reg . 6 Reg . 7 Reg . 8 Reg . 9 Reg . 10 Reg . 11
C 2.018962*** 2.015477*** 3.229586*** 3.053472*** 3.551237*** 3.477610***
(0.452144) (0.422302) (0.426792) (0.408279) (0.326203) (0.325888)
SIR 0.490108*** 0.487385*** 0.519363*** 0.541953*** 0.488460*** 0.489346***
(0.075202) (0.075203) (0.091199) (0.091393) (0.072292) (0.074232)
I 0.179468*** 0.178417*** 0.128353* 0.121260* 0.120771* 0.113766
(0.067440) (0.066033) (0.102773) (0.065989) (0.070159) (0.070057)
G -0.003835 -0.009682 0.128353 -0.019503 -0.031274 -0.030588
(0.049783) (0.045285) (0.054507) (0.045073) (0.048988) (0.042444)
DEBT(-1) 0.035915** 0.019296 0.074655*** 0.054422** 0.049551** 0.023997
(0.017431) (0.021883) (0.021511) (0.021360) (0.020407) (0.016439)
DEBT(-1)^2 0.001300 0.003139*** 0.004416
(0.001929) (0.001029) (0.000858)
U 0.167106*** 0.168013***
(0.031025) (0.032265)
CA 0.028813 0.030538
(0.052086) (0.049781)
LEND 0.017931 0.026429
(0.052212) (0.050046)
Adj. r^2 0.962520 0.964311 0.953969 0.957463 0.961215 0.962544
AIC 2.215984 2.173244 2.426091 2.353400 2.268344 2.236663
BIC 2.853501 2.839095 3.065453 3.021178 2.937454 2.920319
DW 0.715990 0.730225 0.750907 0.722754 0.678998 0.739117
19However, the roles of the fiscal variables show that there is an econometricalconnection between their movements upon the dependent variable. In otherwords, according to regression 3 the lagged debt variable suggests that anadditional percentage debt increase leads to a roughly 0,0572 percentageincrease upon the long-term government bond yields among the small OECDcountries when scenario of acceleration effect has been considered.
As mentioned above in the case of the G7 sample, when including both fiscalbalance and debt level, both annually lagged, the debt variable is insignificantwhile the fiscal balance is significant pointing toward a collinearity dilemma9.Interestingly, when looking at the different information criteria we can concludethat the G7 sample has lower criteria values, which supports the argument thatthere is a higher level of economical homogeneity compared to the smallcountries’ sample.
The analysis should again be considered with caution because of the possibilityof autocorrelation indicated by the Durbin-Watson value. One of the reasons ofthe D-W value is the fact that crises create outliers and since it is panel data thedifficulty of setting an outlier boundary becomes harder. In other words,common crises are considered as outliers10 while individual circumstances arenot regarded as a solid argument for creating dummy-variables that catches forinstance a country specific economic turmoil. Additionally, since according totheory current account is stationary in the long-run it would be a disadvantage tomake it stationary since important information could potentially be lost, leadingto a weaker conclusion of the different influential powers of the long-term yieldstructure. Notwithstanding the two notifications it would be beneficial to turnour attention to our GMM estimations.
An appropriate starting point is to begin with the regressions of the G7 countrieswhen investigating the various potential impacts. According to the GMM resultsin table 3 there are different aspects that need to be addressed since they
9 Such dilemma could possibly be the case when looking at the role of theinterest rate and its function toward inflation.10 For example the recent financial or the EMU crises.
20
clash with the least squares estimations. Comparing the two differentapproaches we can see that in the GMM estimation that includes only lagged debtlevel is not significant while in the corresponding panel least squares regressionit is significant at a one percentage level (see regression 1). The opposite findingapplies for the GDP growth variable and it could be the case that in the OLS
Table 3
GMM Basic Variables for G7 Countries
Variables Reg . 1 Reg . 2 Reg . 3 Reg . 4 Reg . 5
Y(-1) 0.407075*** 0.473742*** 0.453785*** 0.597358*** 0.656491***
(0.053909) (0.071929) (0.078078) (0.058429) (0.034537)
SIR 0.301740*** 0.214380*** 0.310008*** 0.194868*** 0.195715***
(0.024057) (0.052318) (0.027231) (0.059357) (0.054805)
I 0.129160*** 0.302699*** 0.110874** 0.108880 0.082553
(0.039678) (0.097289) (0.050711) (0.071685) (0.068040)
G 0.111705*** 0.195372*** 0.111073*** 0.131703*** 0.127760***
(0.031930) (0.048487) (0.024565) (0.029524) (0.026857)
DEBT(-1) 0.020534 0.044284*** 0. 014720* 0.047037***
(0.013854) (0.015269) (0.007978) (0.006094)
DEBT(-1)^2 -0.004197** -0.006474***
(0.001762) (0.001739)
BB(-1) -0.065513** -0.043567** -0.052555**
(0.027406) (0.021810) (0.025468)
GMM Additional Variables for G7 Countries
Variables Reg . 6 Reg . 7 Reg . 8 Reg . 9 Reg . 10 Reg . 11
Y(-1) 0.405279*** 0.446971*** 0.419827*** 0.430788*** 0.414869*** 0.458091***
(0.065232) (0.086568) (0.052403) (0.052882) (0.055371) (0.076349)
SIR 0.303408*** 0.317674*** 0.288644*** 0.298194*** 0.316163*** 0.324489***
(0.027706) (0.029353) (0.023155) (0.024839) (0.030227) (0.027044)
I 0.130066*** 0.114451** 0.081312 0.101774** 0.107956** 0.089885
(0.045050) (0.053625) (0.052304) (0.047586) (0.043930) (0.054754)
G 0.112049*** 0.112598*** 0.098890*** 0.099826*** 0.099381*** 0.097897***
(0.033643) (0.027251) (0.021402) (0.014403) (0.022269) (0.021154)
DEBT(-1) 0.019863 0.041904** -0.008120 0.01906 0.019538 0.041550***
(0.018671) (0.018199) (0.008752) (0.020721) (0.013960) (0.015341)
DEBT(-1)^2 -0.004306** -0.001118 -0.003827**
(0.001729) (0.001385) (0.001479)
U 0.006614 0.029553
(0.050129) (0.037559)
CA -0.085843** -0.075001*
(0.039917) (0.038370)
LEND -0.047614*** -0.050223***
(0.015285) (0.018787)
21regressions other variables such as the debt variable makes the growth variableinsignificant as they are rather heavily correlated with one another (see thecorrelation matrices in the appendix). Interestingly, the annually lagged fiscalbalance variable shares the same econometrical finding at a five percentagesignificant level. Hence, if the budget balance increases by an additionalpercentage unit it decreases the yield curve, in general, by roughly 0,065-percentage unit.
Turning our attention to the acceleration effect regression 3 captures thesquared, annually lagged debt level of GDP such non-linearity effect is presentwhen looking at the GMM estimations while compared to the least squares it isnot present, pointing toward another contradiction in our results. Nonetheless, ifsuch effect exists it means that if a G7 country increases its debt level further itaccelerates the debt impact causing a more vulnerable fiscal position for thecountry and it leads to an increase in the yield level. Next step is to look atregression 5 that is the interaction between debt level and budget balance. Inshort, the two variables are significant, at a 5-percentage level, and it could mostpossible be explained by the relaxation of various Gauss-Markov assumptions,which GMM method possess. In other words, the dynamic regression capturesthe different fiscal effects caused by the debt level and by budget balance that is:by increasing the variables, it causes the yield curve to climb further and in thecase of the budget balance it decreases the yield curve. In brief, we can also seethat the acceleration effect becomes stronger when budget balance is includedalong with the debt level.
Moving on to the various additional variables, in order to have consistentcomparisons with the least square regressions we focus on the role of the debtlevel and its acceleration effects. The unemployment rate variable is insignificantwhereas, as mentioned before, is significant in the panel least squares estimates.Moreover in contrast to the G7 panel least squares there are oppositeoccurrences when looking at the roles of current account and private lending.Additionally, current account makes the debt level and its acceleration effectinsignificant. Nickel & Vansteenkiste (2008) have found a rather similar relationwhen looking at the interaction between current account and the level of debt
22that is: as mentioned earlier the interaction becomes insignificant after a certainthreshold, which could be described by the Ricardian equivalence i.e. through theperspective of consumers a further increase in the debt level is downplayed bythe consumption fall.
Table 4
GMM Basic Variables for Small Countries
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5
Y(-1) 0.679741*** 0.575709*** 0.675245*** 0.626481*** 0.618451***
(0.063189) (0.087171) (0.063889) (0.068462) (0.072704)
SIR 0.241899*** 0.204042*** 0.247122*** 0.166984*** 0.171174***
(0.037435) (0.042047) (0.040953) (0.046823) (0.047272)
I 0.025446 0.142919*** 0.023658 0.130064*** 0.129371***
(0.023821) (0.045667) (0.023140) (0.041407) (0.041185)
G 0.015772 -0.027972 0.017445 -0.034243 -0.032782
(0.031620) (0.036213) (0.029218) (0.026386) (0.025875)
DEBT(-1) 0.015131** 0.009100 -0.014422 -0.017970
(0.006196) (0.006445) (0.011748) (0.013424)
DEBT(-1)^2 0.001295 0.000943
(0.001077) (0.000918)
BB(-1) -7.735069*** -7.415182** -7.337299**
(2.234405) (3.067451) (3.000584)
GMM Additional Variables for Small Countries
Variables Reg. 6 Reg. 7 Reg. 8 Reg. 9 Reg. 10 Reg. 11
Y(-1) 0.586396*** 0.586475*** 0.604107*** 0.599155*** 0.631482*** 0.626567***
(0.078057) (0.077809) (0.061566) (0.063370) (0.066320) (0.065541)
SIR 0.314101*** 0.313970*** 0.304793*** 0.306775*** 0.270645*** 0.272981***
(0.029717) (0.028993) (0.035240) (0.036424) (0.036469) (0.037897)
I 0.070795 0.070893 0.072348 0.073111 0.046727 0.046634
(0.044242) (0.053625) (0.057430) (0.057380) (0.036595) (0.036202)
G 0.048335* 0.048267* 0.052839*** 0.053690*** 0.029616 0.030542
(0.024677) (0.025108) (0.014658) (0.014131) (0.028300) (0.028143)
DEBT(-1) 0.008529 0.008825 0.014711 0.010064 0.017657** 0.012440
(0.013371) (0.012139) (0.009970) (0.010127) (0.007263) (0.007657)
DEBT(-1)^2 -5.92E-05 0.000825 0.000930
(0.000936) (0.000814) (0.000772)
U 0.058107*** 0.058373**
(0.021183) (0.023734)
CA -0.006790 -0.006701
(0.013974) (0.013317)
LEND -0.011468 -0.011597
(0.013399) (0.013155)
23Moving on the small countries in table 4, in brief the budget balance lagged byone year appears to be significant whereas the debt level and its squaredvariable are insignificant throughout the core dynamic regressions. In otherwords, the previous year’s debt level does not contribute to a climb in thecurrent yield curve. A short presentation of the different control variablescontributions to the government bond yield show that under the presences ofdebt and its acceleration effect, unemployment ratio is significant pointingtoward a scenario of a one percentage increase in unemployment rate pushes theslope of the yield curve upwards with approximately 0.058 %.
Surprisingly, the growth variable is positive and significant11, hence it pointstoward an ambiguity where one side of the coin represents the hypothesis thatinvestors view an increase in growth as an indication of future downturn in thebusiness cycle. While on the other side, it contradicts with the theory that ahigher growth rate should reduce the yield spread of the government bondbecause it goes hand in hand with a more stable economy. Moving on to theinclusions of the current account and private lending variables, they both areinsignificant (regression 10 and 11). Thus, according to the estimations thesetwo variables do not contribute variations of the OECD countries’ yield curves.The story is, however, different when looking at the short-term interest rate andthe instrumental variable. In brief, the significance of the short-run interest rateconnects well with the expectations theory.
To be able to separate the effects the variables have upon the government bondyields, we have run a series of joint regression for the two samples. We can theninclude dummies for individual countries or groups of countries. This can furthergive us confidence about the conclusion drawn in the separate samples oroppose the same. It can also help us see how the coefficients vary between thesamples and reveal new correlations.  Some regressions that were consistentlyrun when investigating the separate samples have been discarded as they gaveno additional significant information there, and were hence uninformative at aholistic level. We will still keep debt squared included as this is a variable that
11 As mentioned previously, the correlation matrix for the small countries sharethe same tendency as in the G-7’s matrix.
24has been discussed widely in previous studies. All the OLS regressions run withthe joint sample show worryingly low Durbin Watson statistics at around 0.6 -0.7. Although we have used white period covariance method, we shouldaccordingly be cautious with the standard errors and consequently the p-values.Variables found to be significant at a 1% level are still to be seen as very reliablethough.
Table 5
OLS
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6
C 3.118194*** 3.400514*** 3.111615*** 1.890204*** 3.090215*** 3.417905***
(0.286435) (0.248052) (0.276048) (0.391590) (0.295671) (0.184381)
SIR 0.487950*** 0.401956*** 0.487982*** 0.449251*** 0.495137*** 0.445554***
(0.057295) (0.034661) (0.057704) (0.048199) (0.052706) (0.033950)
I 0.178155*** 0.164428** 0.177739*** 0.237530*** 0.166987*** 0.181719***
(0.057726) (0.078916) (0.057426) (0.063087) (0.057650) (0.056763)
G 0.021220 0.015318 0.021427 0.054965 0.019067 0.007787
(0.039711) (0.051316) (0.043463) (0.042265) (0.042265) (0,038206)
DEBT(-1) 0.043347*** 0.041047** 0,020222 0.041825*** 0.033299***
(0.014275) (0.017043) (0,012479) (0.021883) (0.011345)
DEBT(-1)^2 0.000416
BB(-1) -0.068417*
(0.038688)
U 0.161464***
(0.026348)
CA 0.023767
(0.039607)
LEND 0.005882
(0.013537)
Adj. r^2 0.956368 0.956927 0.956282 0.960752 0.954411 0.960299
AIC 2.321018 2.255527 2.324832 2.216968 2.302590 2.237553
BIC 2.785556 2.770915 2.798135 2.690271 2.781259 2.717781
DW 0.685742 0.633487 0.689188 0.671465 0.671664 0.712825
First off, the joint sample is run accordingly to previous form, as can be seen intable 5 (OLS) and table 6 (GMM). In table 5, debt is found to have a similarsignificance and the coefficient is found to be somewhere between the valuesthat are found in the previous tables and there is still no non-linear effect of debtto be found. Opposing the previous OLS regressions, we now cannot observe a
25significant effect of fiscal balance, as can be seen in regression: 2. This will befurther untangled when we include a dummy for the G7 countries although it canalready now be mentioned that it seems small countries have a clearly largerbudget deficit effect.
Table 6.
GMM Basic and Additional Variables Joint Regression
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6
Y(-1) 0.619765*** 0.573895*** 0.626739*** 0.598224*** 0.660305*** 0.621457***
(0.053411) (0.072104) (0.051745) (0.065326) (0.052787) (0.055649)
SIR 0.213809*** 0.182267*** 0.211390*** 0.218544*** 0.210045*** 0.214878***
(0.037369) (0.046670) (0.038778) (0.038245) (0.037229) (0.035860)
I 0.065137*** 0.211466*** 0.065890*** 0.078311*** 0.069973*** 0.071952***
(0.016456) (0.073063) (0.016490) (0.044242) (0.020157) (0.012177)
G 0.064855** 0.059612 0.063438** 0.068629*** 0.075573*** 0.067428***
(0.025650) (0.042179) (0.027397) (0.025895) (0.024312) (0.024803)
DEBT(-1) 0.022989** 0.030353** 0.018683 0.013819** 0.021988**
(0.009852) (0.012353) (0.011506) (0.005978) (0.010555)
DEBT(-1)^2 -0.001962
(0.001596)
BB(-1) -0.017640
(0.013871)
U 0.028966*
(0.016847)
CA -0.023093*
(0.013288)
LEND -0.018855**
(0.009401)
The only additional variable which is significant is unemployment, showingsimilar results as in the corresponding regression for small countries. The notionthat changes in unemployment rate affects small countries more than G7countries remains and the inclusion of the variables still renders in insignificantdebt.
The GMM regressions show a slightly lower significance for debt, which couldpartially be explained by the low D-W statistics in the OLS regressions. Thecoefficient is also about half the OLS-value. Here, fiscal balance is found tounlikely be significant, in line with the general OLS results in table 5. All theadditional variables show significance at a 10% level and net lending at a 5%level as well. They all show intuitive signs and coefficients around the same
26levels (ca. 0,2) as debt indicating that they have an equally large effect on theyield. These findings, together with the previous tables can now be used asbenchmarks when including the dummies and separate the effects. As our goal isto establish if there are any differences in how the market evaluates largecountries and small countries we will naturally include a dummy for that. Wechose to use G7 as the dummy instead of the other way around for arbitraryreasons. We will also include a US dummy since the US is clearly the dominatingeconomic power in the world. Additionally, the US dollar still enjoys a specialposition as the world benchmark currency, making US securities andcommodities less risky.
In table 7 we observe the OLS regressions with the G7 dummy included. Notsurprisingly, adjusted r-squared, AIC/BIC and DW are all very similar to table 5as the two tables describe the same data. No difference can be established for thedebt of for interest rate in regression 1 and 2. In regression 3 we can see big andsignificant difference in how fiscal balance is affecting the yield. Keep in mindthat the value obtained for the interacted variable is to be added to the valueobtained from the non-interacted variable, the interacted variable value showsthe difference between the two. The main take away is that these coefficients aresignificantly different from one another and this is further strengthened byprevious regressions. The other coefficient that is of interest here isunemployment, which also is found significantly different in regression 5. Whenconsulting the GMM regressions in table 8 the last observation is not supported,leading us to doubt that there is any true effect. The observation regardingbudget balance is further strengthened though. By bearing the various cloudedstatistical properties in the least square estimations, nonetheless together withthe dynamic estimations, it does show that fiscal balance play an important rolein the establishment of influential determinants on the OECD markets.
In table 9, we have included the US dummy in identical fashion as with the G7dummy in table 7.  We cannot establish that debt is differently judged for US andall other countries. In regression 2 we can distinguish between the short interestrate effects, but since we are looking at OLS regressions and the US value is onlysignificant at a 10% level, we are cautious to make any further conclusions based
27
Table 7.
OLS Joint regressions using the G7 dummy
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 Reg. 7
C 3.127514*** 3.146641*** 3.140351*** 2.079765*** 2.178969*** 3.094757*** 3.396795***
(0.282172) (0.253382) (0.191873) (0.382807) (0.300309) (0.285922) (0.183340)
SIR 0.485005*** 0.496067*** 0.406704*** 0.465415*** 0.451670*** 0.491264*** 0.447147***
(0.054985) (0.047289) (0.034585) (0.048647) (0.044302) (0.049497) (0.034617)
SIR*G7 -0.031935
(0.027422)
I 0.181178*** 0.105576* 0.192072*** 0.222419*** 0.164622*** 0.164982*** 0.182183***
(0.055885) (0.057796) (0.073449) (0.055709) (0.060322) (0.058070) (0.055807)
I*G7 0.168761**
(0.075412)
G 0.023035 0.014510 0.017297 0.045023 0.015313 0.005103
(0.039097) (0.041900) (0.053423) (0.040888) (0.041908) (0.040073)
G*G7 0.010254
(0.040265)
DEBT(-1) 0.050799*** 0.053739** 0.016530* 0.012001 0.040172** 0.034144***
(0.022047) (0.021089) (0.009059) (0.012531) (0.015757) (0.011201)
DEBT(-1) *G7 -0.014911 -0.012200 0.024565
(0.021140) (0.018636) (0.019896)
BB(-1) -10.12201***
(2.733850)
BB(-1) *G7 10.02896***
(2.722348)
U 0.158682*** 0.173294***
(0.026092) (0.021995)
U*G7 -0.047824 -0.078972*
(0.040469) (0.043010)
CA 0.039588
(0.051245)
CA*G7 -0.050838
(0.077302)
Lend 0.025371
(0.048261)
Lend*G7 -0.025692
(0.050079)
Adj. r^2 0.956362 0.957690 0.959626 0.961763 0.962745 0.954616 0.960369
AIC 2.322986 2.297577 2.192868 2.192689 2.174874 2.299938 2.237644
BIC 2.796289 2.797174 2.717981 2.674757 2.661816 2.787472 2.726765
DW 0.692065 0.711091 0.674017 0.720869 0.721789 0.672561 0.717001
28on that. The budget balance is not significantly different, saying that the USA isnot different from all the other countries in this matter. If we ran the US dummyin a sample with only the USA and the small countries, excluding the other G7countries, we would likely have seen a different result.
Table 8.
GMM Joint regressions using the G7 dummy
Variables Reg . 1 Reg . 2 Reg . 3 Reg . 4 Reg . 5 Reg . 6
Y(-1) 0.635494*** 0.621033*** 0.486989*** 0.596953*** 0.662422*** 0.625186***
(0.071574) (0.053144) (0.079996) (0.066281) (0.053730) (0.057255)
SIR 0.206283*** 0.214020*** 0.213840*** 0.218413*** 0.210717*** 0.211937***
(0.053423) (0.037162) 0.036541 (0.038156) (0.037790) (0.037232)
SIR*G7 -0.001828
(0.062382)
I 0.081118*** 0.064084*** 0.239625*** 0.078845*** 0.069826*** 0.072323***
(0.057796) (0.015630) (0.080595) (0.018348) (0.020097) (0.012518)
I*G7 -0.038963
(0.054806)
G 0.059515* 0.064647** 0.051881 0.068386*** 0.077003*** 0.069636***
(0.030928) (0.025579) (0.045619) (0.026246) (0.077003) (0.025977)
G*G7 0.014860
(0.027193)
DEBT(-1) 0.017445** 0.021276** 0  0.018868 0.013951** 0.021124**
(0.008739) (0.009201) (0.011931) (0.005861) (0.010733)
DEBT(-1)
*G7
0.005681 0.003717
(0.020185) (0.011598)
BB(-1) -8.383218***
(2.959643)
BB(-1) *G7 8.336743***
(2.950735)
U 0.031370*
(0.018245)
U*G7 -0.009261
0.036496
CA -0.026772
(0.018535)
CA*G7 0.011998
(0.047442)
Lend -0.031331
(0.019811)
Lend*G7 0.016636
(0.020232)
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Table 9.
OLS Joint regressions using the US dummy
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6
C 3.116410*** 3.075707*** 3.383907*** 1.979149*** 3.090211*** 3.413246***
(0.286718) (0.361219) (0.270377) (0.386505) (0.295881) (0.182188)
SIR 0.488525*** 0.470411*** 0.390889*** 0.467717*** 0.495116*** 0.445968***
(0.057479) (0.059947) (0.033876) (0.048734) (0.053401) (0.033912)
SIR*US 0.070038*
(0.037316)
I 0.177844*** 0.196344*** 0.204194** 0.222864*** 0.166967*** 0.180467***
(0.057875) (0.058173) (0.087316) (0.056503) (0.057983) (0.057332)
I*US -0.087690
(0.117898)
G 0.020716 0.046856 0.010766 0.046204 0.019062 0.007390
(0.039786) (0.051814) (0.058328) (0.039742) (0.042447) (0.038368)
G*US 0.016222
(0.028055)
DEBT(-1) 0.043009*** 0.056372*** 0.015908* 0.041817*** 0.032969***
(0.014447) (0.019135) (0.009416) (0.016061) (0.011276)
DEBT(-1)*US 0.008401 0.017573
(0.011830) (0.016199)
BB(-1) -0.073807*
(0.040288)
BB(-1)*US 0.054041
(0.040510)
U 0.146608***
(0.023907)
U*US 0.017846
(0.034135)
CA 0.023805
(0.040704)
CA*US -0.001053
(0.071394)
Lend 0.006206
(0.013868)
Lend*US -0.035098
(0.042501)
Adj. r^2 0.956270 0.946791 0.951210 0.961595 0.954301 0.960212
AIC 2.325098 2.521296 2.378084 2.197077 2.306863 2.241609
BIC 2.798401 2.994599 2.883749 2.679145 2.794397 2.730730
DW 0.685752 0.633264 0.562408 0.718256 0.671634 0.713390
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Table 10.
GMM Joint regressions using the US dummy
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6
Y(-1) 0.565676*** 0.605792*** 0.539516*** 0.587347*** 0.658300*** 0.609031***
(0.044854) (0.059781) (0.086138) (0.068073) (0.053984) (0.058584)
SIR 0.227388*** 0.217691*** 0.189987*** 0.223346*** 0.213552*** 0.213788***
(0.038019) (0.040326) (0.046187) (0.039665) (0.037535) (0.037657)
SIR*US 0.011284
(0.061021)
I 0.082909** 0.068369*** 0.213642*** 0.081289*** 0.073729*** 0.079004***
(0.032368) (0.019593) (0.078846) (0.019031) (0.021106) (0.014070)
I*US 0.007197
(0.119218)
G 0.057300** 0.066740** 0.057689 0.071051** 0.081392*** 0.067850**
(0.025530) (0.025579) (0.042493) (0.026246) (0.025709) (0.026367)
G*US 0.087482***
(0.029511)
DEBT(-1) 0.022050* 0.026425** 0.021487* 0.016403*** 0.025697**
(0.012679) (0.012095) (0.011713) (0.006176) (0.011329)
DEBT(-1) *US -0.003027 -0.002338
(0.041209) (0.041482)
BB(-1) -0.018848
(0.018980)
BB(-1) *US 0.008293
(0.090199)
U 0.029904**
(0.015063)
U*US 0.021102
(0.051631)
CA -0.026869**
(0.013189)
CA*US 0.083466**
(0.033429)
Lend -0.021683**
(0.010460)
Lend*US 0.063984**
(0.032425)Unemployment rate is found to be different from the other countries, but the UScoefficient is not significant. The GMM results in table 10 show that twoadditional variables, current account and net lending/borrowing, are
31significantly different for the US. Both coefficients are higher for the US meaningthat the market evaluates the US current negative current account balance andtheir need to borrow money from abroad to cover national expenditures assomething that would lower the ten year bond yield. This clearly indicates thatthe US has a unique position in the bond market.
The current account deviation can most likely be explained through the fact thatthe US trade balance has been increasing steadily for a long time meanwhileinterest rates has been kept low, but it still reaffirms the widely accepted notionthat the US can run high trade deficits without being penalized by the market ashard as any other country. The same goes for net lending, which would call forcaution in many other economies, as it in the long run increases the risk for afinancial bubble. The values reported for the residual countries are in line withthe joint regressions in table 6.
These results show that the G7 countries are only enjoying parts of the USA’sunique position as the leading world economy. They do however suggest thatthey have a certain advantage in regards of budget balance penalisation andpossibly in regards of unemployment, where we at least see that the smallercountries do experience an effect whereas we cannot say the same for the G7countries.
In short, there is a statistical difference between the G7 countries and the smallercountries in regards of how the market perceives fiscal balance and there is aclear connection between unemployment rate and bond yields for smallcountries where we can see no similar effect for the G7 group. These findings arestrengthened by the joint sample analysis. The original separate regressionsfound a negative correlation between bond yield and lending (and a weakpossible correlation to current account balance) for the G7 countries, but thiscould not be confirmed by the joint analysis. However, including the US dummy,we found that the US differs from other countries in how current account balanceand lending is assessed to affect the risk of the bond. The market seems toperceive the US as a less risky investment regardless of what the macroeconomicvariables that have been utilized.
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7. Robustness ChecksIn order to further strengthen the findings presented above, we need to makesure the results are consistent over time and different constellations. Ourrobustness checks will be performed on the regressions which are of interest forour analysis and consequently our conclusions. We could include or dropvariables from regressions as well as change the sample size to see if our findingsare consistent. However, we want to be cautious not to include too manyvariables as well as not limiting our sample too much as the first will render uswith possible false significance and the second give us a hard time finding anystatistical evidence in the regressions. With this in mind, robustness checks onthe joint dataset are more likely to give us affirmative confirmations than on thetwo separate samples. Since we have already regressed the data in a sequence ofconstellation in the result and analysis part, this section will only check if ourresults are consistent over time since all regressions above are performed in thesame time-span (1980-2013).
Up until 2008 we can get statistically clear results, but the impact of the financialcrisis makes the results rather ambiguous. Financial crashes in 00 and 87 arealso likely to affect our results, but not to the same extension as the sub-primecrisis: they seem to have left the market shaken but not stirred. In order tomaintain a sample size around 150 observations and still exclude enoughobservations to make a difference, the time periods 1980-2000 and 1990-2013will be used. All specifications are just as in the regressions in the result andanalysis part.
For the small countries we can conclude that budget balance is only relevantwhen excluding the latest financial crisis. Debt does not seem to be significant forany of the specific time periods, which is rather surprising as it showed fairlygood significance over the whole period. Unemployment on the other handseems to be robust and shows relatively even values over time.
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Robustness, small
Variable and period OLS GMM
Debt(-1) 80-00 0.117035** (0.046107) 0.010573 (0.017618)
Debt(-1) 90-13 0.041310** (0.020313) 0.010325 (0.014774)
BB(-1) 80-00 -14.48613*** (3.387246) -10.10130*** (2.936938)
BB(-1) 90-13 -10.99337*** (3.599003) -5.934507 (4.702956)
U 80-00 0.182173*** (0.012023) 0.061864*** (0.016123)
U 90-13 0.139337*** (0.026219) 0.070937** (0.030259)
Turning our attention to the G7 countries we can find evidence for debt beingsignificant for the period before the crisis. The values for the early period is inline with what was observed for the whole period, although a little higher.Although the OLS regressions show significance for the later period, the fact thatthere is none in the GMM discourages us from drawing any conclusions. Not toosurprisingly there is no significance to observe for budget balance, having shownsmall effects for the G7 countries for the whole period. Opposite of the smallcountries, unemployment shows no interpretable coefficients and the same goesfor current account. Net lending is however significant for the first of the twoperiods, possibly also distorted in the later sample by the financial crisis.
Robustness, G7
Variable and period OLS GMM
Debt(-1) 80-00 0.055195** (0.021254) 0.055265** (0.026476)
Debt(-1) 90-13 0.018750*** (0.005937) 0.016301 (0.012290)
BB(-1) 80-00 -0.149059* (0.076022) -0.085011 (0.075058)
BB(-1) 90-13 -0.086002*** (0.029670) -0.020175 (4.702956)
U 80-00 0.028243 (0.110559) -0.001875 (0.078355)
U 90-13 0.086164* (0.049157) -0.031190 (0.052511)
CA 80-00 -0.141234 (0.105123) -0.055819 (0.065936)
CA 90-13 -0.052155 (0.042018) -0.077997 (0.050202)
Lend 80-00 -0.017392** (0.008098) -0.041197*** (0.015457)
Lend 90-13 -0.007390 (0.015441) -0.035059 (0.023366)
Looking at the last table, all interacted variables that showed potential have beencomposed. There is again strong evidence that the G7 countries do not share thelarge effect of budget balance that the small countries have, this is however onlycertain for the earlier period. In a similar fashion, unemployment in the G7countries shows no significance for the later period while the earlier havepotential correlation. Turning to the US variables, unemployment and current
34account show high levels of interpretability during the earlier period but little forthe later. Although lending is significant at a 1% level in the OLS regression for90-13, the fact that the GMM regression shows an extremely high p-value makesit rather uncertain whether it has any real correlation. Through all, it seems thetime period from 80-00 generates more significant values, again largelyexplained by the recent banking crisis.
Robustness, Joint with Dummies
Variable and period OLS GMM
BB(-1)*G7 80-00 16.73379*** (4.006942) 12.15359** (5.790310)
BB(-1)*G7 90-13 9.020207** (3.496346) 5.241344 (3.862578)
U*G7 80-00 -0.068596 (0.104657) 0.206433** (0.086203)
U*G7 90-13 -0.033175 (0.035848) -0.026164 (0.065889)
U*US 80-00 0.175812*** (0.048709) 0.132431*** (0.039350)
U*US 90-13 -0.096364** (0.039809) -0.043152 (0.157802)
CA*US 80-00 0.071089 (0.126769) 0.159408*** (0.054011)
CA*US 90-13 -0.101817* (0.054333) 0.038224 (0.039364)
Lend*US 80-00 -0.005485 (0.042271) 0.070704 (0.072211)
Lend*US 90-13 -0.122585*** (0.034494) 0.015101 (0.050525)
Note that all coefficients in this table are interacted with dummies and relative
to a base coefficient. The difference between the two is observed.
8. ConclusionThis thesis investigates the effect the economic influence of a country has on itslong term bond yields. We look at the difference between G7 countries and non-G7, but OECD, countries and at the difference between the US and the otherOECD countries. This is something that we have not seen in any previous studies.The approach is however supported by macroeconomic theory and our resultspartly support the same. The econometrical approach used in this paper hasbeen used by earlier empirical studies e.g. Baldami & Kumar (2010), which isthat they used panel least squares with fixed effects plus GMM estimator.
We have found that unemployment rate has a greater effect on bond yields insmall countries, this is especially true when excluding the financial crisis years,compared to the G7 countries. Another dividing factor seems to be the budgetbalance where smaller countries show much larger numbers than the G7countries; this is especially true for the earlier years of our sample period. Thedebt effect seems to be rather small, a strong contradiction since it is heavily
35correlated with the budget deficit. Neither lending nor current account has anysignificant effect on the bond yields.
In the case of the G7 countries, there is a fairly clear connection between debtand bond yield. This is again especially true for the earlier years and moreuncertain for the latter. There is however no clear effect of budget balance and ifthere is one it is most likely rather small. Regarding unemployment and currentaccount, we cannot draw any conclusions based on the regressions. Lending hasa small reversed effect on the yield though. The main advantage of the G7countries is then that they can borrow more money before they are penalizedthrough increased bond yields and that they do not have to suffer as much fromhigh unemployment rates.
Two things are worth mentioning about the US dummy results: 1. there is areversed significant effect from lending and current account and 2. the growthrate of the economy has a larger effect on the yield. The first may indicate thatthe USA is above some of the rules. It can run large trade deficits and borrowlarge amounts from abroad, both the government and the private sector, withoutgetting penalized by the market. The second indicates that the growth of theAmerican economy is what is to some extent driving international bond yields,not just governmental. This is probably easiest explained through the fact thatthe USA is the biggest importer of goods and services in the world, if the USeconomy is limping, it will likely affect the markets valuation of other nationspossibility to repay loans given shrinking tax incomes to the government.
For future research we suggest that it would be advantageous to includeforecasted explanatory variables rather than current variables, as it has beendone in previous studies on similar topics. It can also be advisable to exclude thecrisis years of 2008-2012 for higher significance and a better “normal times”model. If possible, an alternative to excluding the crisis could be more data andenough observations to use a moving window. This would certainly smooth thecrisis years and make for a better long-term estimation of the regressions.
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Appendix
1. List of Countries
G7 GDP Smaller OECD
Countries
GDP
United States 13.298.023.488 Spain 1.107.343.947
Japan 3.925.960.830 Australia 808.082.339
Germany 2.591.284.332 Netherlands 549.231.755
United Kingdom 1.847.259.417 Belgium 325.663.047
France 1.766.294.085 Switzerland 296.729.845
Italy 1.449.902.925 Austria 277.693.156
Canada 1.211.159.672 Denmark 154.105.737
Finland 147.673.009
Average 3.727.126.392 Average 458.315.354
2012 years nominal values in USD
2. Variables Included
Short name Variable
y 10-year sovereign bonds interest rate (yield)
sir Short-term interest rate, will work as proxy for the general risk
appetite – how risky the market deems the overall situation.
Also, this will ensure we look at solvency and not liquidity of
the countries.
i Inflation rate, to better capture the real yield
g GDP growth, proxy for an economy’s economic state
debt First difference of government debt as percentage of GDP.
Reflects a government’s service cost of debt.
bb Budget balance as percentage of GDP
u Unemployment rate
ca Current account (balance of trade and net factor income) as
percentage of GDP
lend Net lending/borrowing needed to finance all expenditures
within an economy. As percentage of GDP
bm Broad money Supply. Used to test for monetization of debt
(regressions not included in thesis). As percentage of GDP
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G7Countries
BB
BM
CA
DEBT
G
I
LEND
SIR
U
Y
BB
1.000000
0.072192
0.082256
-0.546134
0.263079
0.072243
0.126973
-0.053522
-0.379832
-0.224506
BM
0.072192
1.000000
-0.049116
-0.001550
0.042098
0.045036
-0.041233
0.083326
-0.036851
0.039492
CA
0.082256
-0.049116
1.000000
-0.106069
-0.087559
-0.437226
0.976140
-0.432603
-0.258368
-0.449570
DEBT
-0.546134
-0.001550
-0.106069
1.000000
-0.551968
0.027503
-0.144995
0.124000
0.263884
0.155952
G
0.263079
0.042098
-0.087559
-0.551968
1.000000
0.032551
-0.085507
0.096202
0.016162
0.110616
LEND
0.126973
-0.041233
0.976140
-0.144995
-0.085507
-0.449614
1.000000
-0.468597
-0.210746
-0.490510
I
0.072243
0.045036
-0.437226
0.027503
0.032551
1.000000
-0.449614
0.738537
-0.053834
0.691943
SIR
-0.053522
0.083326
-0.432603
0.124000
0.096202
0.738537
-0.468597
1.000000
-0.016285
0.931041
U
-0.379832
-0.036851
-0.258368
0.263884
0.016162
-0.053834
-0.210746
-0.016285
1.000000
0.140511
Small
Countries
BB
BM
CA
DEBT
G
I
LEND
SIR
U
Y
BB
1.000000
0.072192
0.082256
-0.546134
0.263079
0.072243
0.126973
-0.053522
-0.379832
-0.224506
BM
0.072192
1.000000
-0.049116
-0.001550
0.042098
0.045036
-0.041233
0.083326
-0.036851
0.039492
CA
0.082256
-0.049116
1.000000
-0.106069
-0.087559
-0.437226
0.976140
-0.432603
-0.258368
-0.449570
DEBT
-0.546134
-0.001550
-0.106069
1.000000
-0.551968
0.027503
-0.144995
0.124000
0.263884
0.155952
G
0.263079
0.042098
-0.087559
-0.551968
1.000000
0.032551
-0.085507
0.096202
0.016162
0.110616
LEND
0.126973
-0.041233
0.976140
-0.144995
-0.085507
-0.449614
1.000000
-0.468597
-0.210746
-0.490510
I
0.072243
0.045036
-0.437226
0.027503
0.032551
1.000000
-0.449614
0.738537
-0.053834
0.691943
SIR
-0.053522
0.083326
-0.432603
0.124000
0.096202
0.738537
-0.468597
1.000000
-0.016285
0.931041
U
-0.379832
-0.036851
-0.258368
0.263884
0.016162
-0.053834
-0.210746
-0.016285
1.000000
0.140511
3. Correlation Matrices
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G7
B
B
B
M
C
A
D
EB
T
G
I
LEN
D
SIR
U
Y
M
ean
-4.219516
5.802373
-1.769059
2.680992
1.911219
2.698919
-0.551599
5.114400
7.712535
6.076205
M
edian
-3.719367
5.644571
-2.300000
1.800000
2.118007
2.200000
-1.158069
4.391767
7.950000
5.010000
M
axim
um
3.545093
17.68213
7.500000
18.43470
7.258980
13.30000
7.533045
18.35861
11.92500
16.29000
M
inim
um
-12.68582
-6.065420
-12.42900
-9.380000
-5.526976
-1.300000
-5.272844
0.051521
2.892000
0.840000
Std. D
ev.
3.156337
4.100547
3.429756
4.903908
2.072884
2.308302
2.640158
3.966852
2.132299
3.451178
Skew
ness
-0.340603
-0.094994
0.139571
0.621831
-1.041179
1.906092
0.771051
0.864809
-0.176440
0.892573
Kurtosis
3.014612
3.052501
4.091605
3.632976
5.125577
8.442938
3.316692
3.233189
2.133051
3.221781
Jarque-Bera
3.578644
0.299483
9.785901
15.01085
68.25184
340.3871
19.10414
23.47923
6.753462
24.94363
Probability
0.167073
0.860931
0.007499
0.000550
0.000000
0.000000
0.000071
0.000008
0.034159
0.000004
Sum
-780.6105
1073.439
-327.2760
495.9836
353.5756
499.3000
-102.0459
946.1640
1426.819
1124.098
Sum
 Sq. D
ev.
1833.094
3093.866
2164.433
4424.890
790.6199
980.3998
1282.560
2895.408
836.5929
2191.556
O
bservations
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
Sm
all Countries
BB
BM
CA
DEBT
G
I
LEND
SIR
U
Y
M
ean
-0.019670
542.9846
1.485601
0.544510
2.181394
2.750000
1.331293
5.336347
6.888064
6.216200
M
edian
-0.020655
7.036742
1.902500
-0.045000
2.529565
2.300000
1.785534
4.391767
6.075000
5.460000
M
axim
um
0.070192
116955.5
14.80000
17.41000
6.205788
11.40000
14.47554
17.61167
25.00000
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5. Graphical Illustration of Data
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